1.
Please provide your organization’s comments on the Feb 12, 2026 Financial Planning Initiatives (including Start-up Funding for the Regional Organization for Western Energy) stakeholder call.
Energy Division staff (ED Staff) of the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) develops and administers energy policy and programs to serve the public interest, advises the CPUC, and ensures compliance with CPUC decisions and statutory mandates. Staff provides objective and expert analyses that promote reliable, safe, and environmentally sound energy services at just and reasonable rates for the people of California.[1] Further, Staff advocates on behalf of California ratepayers at the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), under whose jurisdiction CAISO’s transmission planning falls.
ED Staff appreciates this opportunity to review CAISO’s Financial Planning proposals and ask key questions regarding the increase in the CAISO’s revenue requirement, whether CAISO is planning for different outcomes that are outlined in Assembly Bill (AB) 825 (Petrie-Norris, 2025), and cost allocation.
[1] More information about the CPUC Energy Division is available at: https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/about-cpuc/divisions/energy-division
3.
Please provide your organization’s comments on the Revenue Requirement Cap Increase.
CAISO is requesting an increase in the revenue requirement cap of $55 million for 2027 compared to 2026. This increase follows a number of increases to the revenue requirement cap since 2023, CAISO increased the revenue requirement cap from $202 million in 2024 to $245 million in 2025 and $250 million in 2026.[1] CAISO proposes increasing the revenue requirement cap in 2027 by $55 million to $305 million and by $15.3 million in 2028 to $320.3 million. These increases are out of the norm because between 2015 and 2023 the cap remained at $202 million. CAISO explains that this increase is due to “higher operating funding needs, the re-inclusion of cash-funded capital beginning in 2027, and inflationary cost impacts...”[2] and “reduced offsetting revenues as services transition into EDAM.”[3]
Given these significant increases, ED Staff is interested in ensuring the fair allocation of the existing EDAM General Management Charge because the increase in the revenue requirement cap disproportionally affects the CAISO BAA. ED Staff understands that EDAM costs are charged using a “ramp-in” method where costs ramp-up over the first four years of EDAM in order to incentivize new participants to EDAM,[4] and so these costs will fall to California ratepayers to cover in the early years of BAAs’ participation. CAISO explained that this was just and reasonable because “the incentive of the ramp-in model for early adoption increases the overall benefit for California entities,” and because of congestion revenue rights and ancillary services, “EDAM entity load will not have the same access to all these services as the California load will.”[5] However, ED Staff is concerned with ensuring that California ratepayers in the CAISO BAA are not unduly burdened by the costs to implement EDAM while other states enjoy the benefits.
One of the key components of the increase to the revenue requirement cap is a request for $31 million in cash-funded capital starting in 2027. CAISO explains that headroom is needed to provide a buffer “to address potential variability in cost recovery arising from changes in market participation, including the potential exit of participants” from the CAISO that could result in “unanticipated reductions in offsetting revenues….”[6]
ED Staff understands that CAISO is planning for unanticipated outcomes. Given that AB 825 requires CAISO to “maintain the necessary technical capability to operate energy markets in a manner that enables California [market participants] to withdraw from the markets governed by the independent regional organization,”[7] ED Staff has a few questions:
- What changes in market participation is CAISO planning for? Is CAISO planning contingencies for both WEIM participants and EDAM participants exiting the markets?
- Is CAISO also planning for the costs for maintaining the technical capability to operate separate market services as required by AB 825?
- Is CAISO planning for any other unanticipated reductions in offsetting revenue such as reductions in wheeling revenue due to the Subscriber PTO model, or charges to the CAISO BAA from Subscriber PTOs for load that does not sink in California?
CAISO’s request for an increase appears to consider unanticipated costs that could arise if a market participant exits WEIM or EDAM, but does not appear to have accounted for the costs for maintaining the technical capability to offer separate market services as required by AB 825.[8] ED Staff suggests CAISO consider these factors in its revenue requirement.
[1] Memo on 2023 Fees at 5.
[2] Financial Planning Initiative Issue Paper & Straw Proposal (Straw Proposal) at 8, February 5, 2026, available at: https://stakeholdercenter.caiso.com/InitiativeDocuments/Issue-Paper-Straw-Proposal-Financial-Planning-Initiative-Including-Start-up-Funding-for-Regional-Organization-for-Western-Energy-Feb-05-2026.pdf
[3] Financial Planning Straw Proposal Meeting, February 12, 2026 at approximately 6 minutes 25 seconds, available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YrhwKmBdTYA.
[4] A summary of the “ramp-in” method is provided in the CAISO Board of Governor’s Memorandum on Decision on 2023 Cost-of-Service Study driven rate and fee changes (Memo on 2023 Fees), September 13, 2023, available at: https://www.caiso.com/documents/decisionon2024-2026costofservicestudydrivenrateandfeechanges-memo-sep2023.pdf
[5] Memo on 2023 Fees at 7.
[6] Straw Proposal at 9.
[7] California Public Utilities Code (PUC) Section 345.6(e)(1).
[8] AB 825, Public Utilities Code Section 345.6(e)(1) requires CAISO to
“maintain the necessary technical capability to operate energy markets in a manner that enables California electrical corporations, local publicly owned electric utilities, and other applicable market participants to withdraw from the markets governed by the independent regional organization and instead the Independent System Operator would provide separate market services for those entities.”
5.
Please provide any additional feedback.
ED Staff is unclear what it is meant in the staff proposal on page 17 where it states that ROWE start-up costs are allocated “in proportion to market participants’ benefits,”[1] which suggests that that allocation would be based somehow on WEIM benefits methodology, EDAM benefit methodology, or the benefit of the ROWE. The WEIM benefits is not available on a disaggregated basis, and the EDAM benefit methodology incorporates imbalance reserves into the counterfactual, which have not yet been implemented. The EDAM benefits methodology does not compare participation in EDAM to a counterfactual based on status quo market participation today or to CAISO BAA’s participation in EDAM to current day-ahead market participation.
[1] Straw Proposal at 17.